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THE USE OF CONSPIRACY THEORY TO
ESTABLISH IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION: A
DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
ANN ALTHO USE *
INTRODUCTION

p

HYSICAL presence in a state has long been abandoned as a prerequisite to personal jurisdiction.' Under state long-arm statutes,
isolated acts and effects may form the basis for a court's assertion of
power over non-residents. 2 It thus becomes possible to use concepts
derived from substantive law to argue that the acts of one person can
be attributed to another to meet the requirements of these statutes.
For example, agency concepts have been used to enlarge long-arm
jurisdiction. 3 If a non-resident defendant has directed another person
to act for his benefit and under his control in the forum state, the
other party's act may supply the minimum contact needed to support
jurisdiction over the non-resident in an action arising out of the act.4

*

B.F.A. 1973, University of Michigan; J.D. 1981, New York University School

of Law; Member, New York Bar.
1. See Clermont, Restating TerritorialJurisdiction and Venue for State and
FederalCourts, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 411, 414-16 (1981); Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as
a Unified Theory of PersonalJurisdiction:A Reappraisal,59 N.C.L. Rev. 429, 43233 (1981); Kamp, Beyond Minimum Contacts: The Supreme Court's New Jurisdictional Theory, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 19, 29-36 (1980); Comment, World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson: A Limit to the Expansion of Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 69 Calif. L.
Rev. 611, 613-17 (1981); see, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222
(1957). International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315-320 (1945).
2. See, e.g., Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1144 (7th
Cir. 1975) (patent infringement); In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 525
F. Supp. 1265, 1270-71 (D. Md. 1981) (antitrust violation), aff'd sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Mid-Atlantic Toyota Distrib., 704 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1983); Parks v.
Slaughter, 270 F. Supp. 524, 525 (W.D. Okla. 1967) (negligent operation of an
automobile); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
438-43, 176 N.E.2d 761, 764-66 (1961) (negligence in one state causing injury in
another).
3. E.g., Clark v. United States, 481 F. Supp. 1086, 1096-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
appeal dismissed, 624 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1980); Arcata Graphics Corp. v. Murrays
Jewelers & Distribs., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 469, 472 (W.D.N.Y. 1974); Sparrow v.
Goodman, 376 F. Supp. 1268, 1271-72 (W.D.N.C. 1974).
4. See, e.g., Grove Press, Inc. v. Angleton, 649 F.2d 121, 122 (2d Cir. 1981)
(requiring that alleged agent have acted in the forum state "for the benefit of, with
the knowledge and consent of, and under some control by, the nonresident principal"); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 419-20 (9th Cir.
1977) (requiring that alleged in-state actor have acted at the behest of and under the
control of the non-resident defendant; expressly applying principles of common law
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This agency theory is embedded in the law of personal jurisdiction,5
and indeed, many long-arm statutes explicitly grant jurisdiction based
on acts performed through an agent. 6
As a matter of substantive law, a conspirator who performs an act
in furtherance of the conspiracy does so as an agent for his co-conspirators. 7 Plaintiffs have begun to argue that because co-conspirators are
each other's agents for purposes of liability and the act of an agent in

the forum state may establish jurisdiction, they need only allege contacts sufficient for one defendant to obtain jurisdiction over all coconspirators. s
Courts facing this proposed wedding of liability and jurisdiction
law have responded in a variety of ways, ranging from unexamined

agency); Lott v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 913, 917 (D.D.C. 1980)
(requiring "manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act
on his behalf and subject to his control") (emphasis added by court) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1(1) (1957)); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil
Co., 460 F. Supp. 483, 514 (D. Kan. 1978) (requiring that non-resident directed or
purposefully sought benefit from active relationship with entity that acted in forum
state).
5. While this Article will deal exclusively with problems arising out of the use of
conspiracy theory to attribute jurisdictional contacts and will frequently distinguish
uses of conspiracy theory from uses of conventional agency theory, similar problems
arise from the use of the latter and some of the solutions proposed herein may also be
applicable in agency cases.
6. E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 2-209 (Smith-Hurd 1983); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 60-308(b) (Supp. 1982); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 302(a) (McKinney 1972 & West
Supp. 1982-1983).
7. Rutledge v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 327 F. Supp. 1267, 1274 (C.D. Cal.
1971), aff'd, 511 F.2d 668 (1975); see Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d
1057, 1074 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Hoffman v. Halden,
268 F.2d 280, 295-96 (9th Cir. 1959); International Union v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., 416
F. Supp. 1267, 1290 (D. Kan. 1976); Note, Civil Conspiracy:A Substantive Tort?, 59
B.U.L. Rev. 921, 929 (1979).
8. E.g., Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Roussel, 445 F. Supp. 687, 69596 (D. Kan. 1978); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 151
(D.D.C. 1976); Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692, 695-96 (D.D.C. 1973).
Agency analysis has also been used to establish jurisdiction over non-resident
members of a partnership based on the actions of another partner. Intercontinental
Leasing, Inc. v. Anderson, 410 F.2d 303, 305 (10th Cir. 1969); Felicia, Ltd. v. Gulf
American Barge, Ltd., 555 F. Supp. 801, 805-06 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Vespe Contracting
Co. v. Anvan Corp., 433 F. Supp. 1226, 1233-34 & n.11 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Additionally, concepts of agency have been used to justify the admission of a co-conspirator's
hearsay statements made in the furtherance of the conspiracy. Anderson v. United
States, 417 U.S. 211, 218 & n.6 (1974). The co-conspirator exception in the Federal
Rules of Evidence, however, was not based on agency concepts. See Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2) advisory committee note (agency analogy termed a "fiction"). It has been
suggested that a more likely justification for the co-conspirator exception is the
practical necessity of admitting the evidence to obtain a conviction. See Levie,
Hearsay and Conspiracy-A Reexaminationof the Co-Conspirators'Exception to the
Hearsay Rule, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1159, 1163-65 (1954).
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acceptance9 to complete rejection.' 0 Most have assumed that a conspiracy theory of jurisdiction is available in appropriate cases and
have concentrated on identifying the elements that a plaintiff must
demonstrate." At the same time, these courts have attempted to set
standards for resolving jurisdictional motions presenting issues inextricably tied to the merits of the case.' 2 Often courts have tailored
their solutions to the facts of a particular case and thus have provided
little guidance for future litigants. Moreover, because trial courts
exercise discretion in ordering discovery and deferring jurisdictional
findings until trial, appellate courts have had little opportunity to
clarify the requirements for attributing jurisdictional contacts or to
control the potential unfairness involved in deferring consideration of
the jurisdictional issue until after discovery or even until trial on the
merits.
This Article examines the problem of attributing forum contacts by
means of conspiracy theory. It finds that the case law provides neither
a coherent framework for the theory's application nor adequate protection against its abuse. The Article then considers whether the theory satisfies constitutional principles of due process and concludes that
conspiracy concepts have a place in the law of jurisdiction only to the
extent that they help to describe the true relationship between the
non-resident defendant and the forum state. Finally, the Article proposes a two-step process of analyzing whether attribution of contacts
is appropriate in an individual case and suggests a way for courts to
preserve the defendant's due process rights from the outset of a litigation.
I.

THE CASE LAW

A. The Rise of the Conspiracy Theory of Jurisdiction
An isolated exercise of jurisdiction based on the actions of a coconspirator in the forum state occurred in the 1940's. In Giusti v.
Pyrotechnic Industries, 3 the Ninth Circuit permitted service on a
non-resident defendant under sections of the California Civil Code
dealing with service of process on corporations that have withdrawn
9. Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rotary Drilling Servs., 383 F.2d 97, 103 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 904 (1968); Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v.
Roussel, 445 F. Supp. 687, 696 (D. Kan. 1978); Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp.
692, 696-97 (D.D.C. 1973); Maricopa County v. American Petrofina, Inc., 322 F.
Supp. 467, 468-69 (N.D. Cal. 1971). See infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
10. Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 873 n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1976). See
infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
12. See infra pt. II(B).
13. 156 F.2d 351 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 787 (1946).
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from transacting business in the state. 14 The non-resident contended
that the statute did not permit service because the complaint cited
only business transacted by alleged co-conspirators, the corporation
itself having done "nothing in California."' 5 The court flatly stated
that "[t]he California members of the conspiracy were agents of [the
non-resident corporation] in the conspiracy's attempt to destroy appellant's business.' 1 6 It equated co-conspirators with agents employed to
act in the state and, without more, reversed the district court's opinion
ordering that service be quashed.17

It was not until the 1970's that other courts examined the use of
conspiracy concepts to establish personal jurisdiction.', In Leasco

14. Id. at 353. Section 411(2) of the California Civil Code required a corporation
that had previously qualified to transact business to designate the Secretary of State
as its agent for service of process in cases based on a "liability or obligation incurred
within [the] State prior to" the withdrawal. Id. Section 406a, enacted later, permitted service upon a foreign corporation that had transacted business in the state in an
action "arising out of such business," regardless of whether the corporation had ever
complied with the statutory prerequisites to doing business. Id.
15. Id. The plaintiff had charged defendants with a conspiracy to destroy its
business through a monopolization of the fireworks industry. Id. The out-of-state
defendant also argued that service was improper under the statute because the
alleged actions were illegal and thus not transactions of business within the meaning
of the long-arm statute. Id. The court found that combinations to destroy a competitor were usual business transactions prior to the enactment of the antitrust laws and
that legislation forbidding such combinations does not alter their character as business transactions. Id. at 354.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 354-55.
18. The first cases following Giusti espoused a conspiracy theory of venue under
federal antitrust law. Plaintiffs used the Clayton Act's provisions for venue where the
defendant "transacts business," 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982), or "has an agent," 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1982), to consolidate litigation against many antitrust co-conspirators in a single
district. See, e.g., Riss & Co. v. Association of Western Rys., 159 F. Supp. 288, 29596 (D.D.C. 1958); Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 140 F. Supp. 909,
913 (E.D.N.Y. 1956), rev'd, 248 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936
(1958); Ross-Bart Port Theatre, Inc. v. Eagle Lion Films, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 401,
402-03 (E.D. Va. 1954); Steiner v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 140 F. Supp.
906, 907-08 (S.D. Cal. 1953). Finding legislative intent to distinguish venue in
private antitrust cases from venue in cases brought by the government by giving a
wider range of choice to the government, the Supreme Court in dictum termed the
venue theory "frivolous albeit ingenious." Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland,
346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953). Later cases rejected the venue theory and recognized the
initial mistake of using Giusti as authority for it. E.g., Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun
Garden Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491, 492 (9th Cir. 1979); Bertha Bldg. Corp. v.
National Theatres Corp., 248 F.2d 833, 836 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
936 (1958); West Virginia v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 689, 692-97 (D. Minn.
1967); Independent Prods. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 460, 463-65
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); see Byrnes, Bringing the Co-ConspiratorTheory of Venue Up-ToDate and into Proper Perspective, 11 Antitrust Bull. 889, 893-96 (1966).
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DataProcessingEquipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 9 the Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit noted that "the mere presence of one conspirator . . . does not confer personal jurisdiction over another alleged
conspirator.'

20

But in a brief statement it accorded significance to the

contention that one of the alleged conspirators who had acted in the
forum state might have done so under the direction and authority of
the one over whom jurisdiction was sought. 2 1 The court remanded the
case for a determination of whether the facts indicated an agency
relationship.2 2 No fanfare announcing the adoption of a potentially
far-reaching doctrine appears here. Indeed, the court's language indicates that it had simply found in the conspiracy the earmarks of an

ordinary agency relationship
between the non-resident defendant and
23

the in-state actor.
Subsequent cases have viewed Leasco as opening the door to a
conspiracy theory of jurisdiction quite distinct from conventional
agency. But since Leasco itself neither sets forth a usable legal standard governing the conspiracy theory nor examines its constitutionality, cases using the theory in reliance on Leasco omit important
considerations.
The first case to interpret Leasco's discussion of conspiracy was
Turner v. Baxley. 24 Relying on Leasco, the Turner court stated that an
act in furtherance of a conspiracy is alone insufficient to establish

Once venue is established under the Clayton Act, service of process is permitted
"wherever [the defendant] may be found." Clayton Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982).
This consequence does not, however, represent use of a conspiracy theory to impute
jurisdictional contacts for the purposes of a long-arm statute, as was the case in
Giusti. See California Clippers, Inc. v. United States Soccer Football Ass'n, 314 F.
Supp. 1057, 1065-67 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
19. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). Prior to Leasco, the District Court for the
Northern District of California conceded in dictum that a conspiracy theory of
jurisdiction is valid provided the acts allegedly committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy fall within one of the categories of acts the relevant statute enumerates as
bases for jurisdiction. California Clippers, Inc. v. United States Soccer Football
Ass'n, 314 F. Supp. 1057, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
20. 468 F.2d at 1343 (citing Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 248
F.2d 833, 836 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936 (1958), and H.L. Moore
Drug Exch., Inc. v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 384 F.2d 97, 98 (2d Cir.
1967) (per curiam)).
21. 468 F.2d at 1343.
22. Faced with a question of fact as to the relationship between the two alleged
co-conspirators, the court held it an abuse of the trial court's discretion to dismiss the
action for lack of personal jurisdiction without permitting the plaintiffs to obtain
answers to interrogatories they had submitted. On remand, after the plaintiff had
received answers to its interrogatories, the district court granted the motion to
dismiss. 68 F.R.D. 178, 182-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The court found that the plaintiff
was unable to make the required factual showing.
23. See 468 F.2d at 1343. See supra note 4 (standards of agency theory).
24. 354 F. Supp. 963 (D. Vt. 1972).
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personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state co-conspirator. 25 The court
then referred to a discussion of jurisdiction in Leasco that dealt not
with the act of another attributed to the defendant, but with the

effect in the forum state of an act that the defendant had directly
committed. 26 The Leasco court had cautioned that this effects-based
jurisdiction requires careful scrutiny of the defendant's knowledge or
reason to know that the conduct outside the state would have an effect
in the forum state. 27 Without explaining why, the Turner court ap-

plied this standard to the asserted conspiracy-based theory of jurisdiction by analyzing whether the alleged conspiratorial conduct, which
occurred outside the state, entailed actual or constructive knowledge
28
of the effect-the tortious act of the co-conspirator-in the state.
This synthesis of two distinct discussions in Leasco gave the conspiracy
theory of jurisdiction the appearance of an accepted doctrine gov29
erned by recognized standards.

In Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General,30 the plaintiffs

sought to base jurisdiction on one act, committed in the forum and

attributed to the defendants only through the allegation of conspiracy. 3' The court declared that "under certain circumstances" New

York law recognizes a conspiracy theory of jurisdiction. 32 It noted,
however, that the plaintiff bears the burden of going forward with the

25. Id. at 977.
26. Id. at 976-77 (citing Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468
F.2d 1326, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972) (analyzing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
§ 37 (1971))).
27. 468 F.2d at 1341.
28. 354 F. Supp. at 977.
29. In Leasco, on remand, 68 F.R.D. 178, 182-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), another
district court combined the two portions of the Second Circuit opinion discussing
conspiracy and effects jurisdiction.
30. 375 F. Supp. 318 (S.D:N.Y. 1974).
31. Id. at 320-21. Jurisdiction was asserted under the New York long-arm statute, which permits service on a person who has committed a tortious act within the
state. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. §302(a)(2) (McKinney 1973). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e),
state law applies when there is no federal statutory provision for service of process.
The Leasco court had relied on the service provision in § 27 of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act and thus did not refer to state law. 468 F.2d at 1339.
32. 375 F. Supp. at 321-22. The court cited Neilson v. Sal Martorano, Inc., 36
A.D.2d 625, 319 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1971), and American Broadcasting Cos. v.
Hernreich, 40 A.D.2d 800, 338 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1972) (per curiam), for this proposition. 375 F. Supp. at 321-22. It is interesting to note, however, how narrow the
"circumstances" were in these two cases. In Neilson, the plaintiff sued a corporation
and its sole stockholder for fraudulently conveying one parcel of land and delivering
mortgages on another parcel of land and on a crane to the sole stockholder's sister
during the pendency of the plaintiff's wrongful death suit against the corporation. 36
A.D.2d at 626, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 481. The sister, also a defendant, contested the
court's jurisdiction on the ground that she had not acted in New York. Id., 319
N.Y.S.2d at 482. The court's legal analysis consisted of a single sentence:
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evidence 3 and concluded that the facts alleged
did not adequately
"connect" the defendants with the forum state.3 4 Although the plaintiffs came forward with allegations of evidentiary facts tending to
show the existence of a plan, they could not show that the plan was
aimed at them or even that the plan resulted in the particular act that
occurred in the forum state.35 Because the attempt to connect the
defendants to the act in the state "was based on nothing but speculation,' 36 the court found it unfair to subject them to the burdens of
discovery and other pretrial proceedings and3 7denied the plaintiffs'
request to defer the motion pending discovery.
Socialist Workers Party strictly analyzed the evidentiary facts and
kept a rein on discovery, 38 but it also spurred the growth of the
conspiracy theory in two significant ways. First, it created the impression that the theory existed in state law, 39 obscuring the fact that it is a
creature of the federal courts.40 Second, it stated the principle that
allegations of conspiracy, if they are sufficiently definite and if they
"connect" the defendant to an act occurring in the forum state, can
form the basis for the assertion of jurisdiction over non-resident deA trier of the facts could find that the defendant Perez conspired with her
brother to effect fraudulent conveyances, that he acted as her agent in
preparing and recording the mortgages and in the payment to her in satisfaction of the mortgages, and that those acts therefore constituted tortious
acts in New York.
Id. (emphasis added). The word "conspired" appears, but analytically serves only to
describe a relationship between two parties and to support a conclusion of agency.
In Hernreich, the non-resident defendant had bribed a New York employee of the
plaintiff corporation, thereby inducing that employee to carry out certain illegal acts
in New York for the non-resident's benefit. 40 A.D.2d at 800, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 148. In
a one-page per curiam opinion, the court characterized the agreement between the
non-resident and the employee as an "illegal conspiracy," concluded that the employee had acted as the non-resident's agent, and imputed the New York acts to the
non-resident defendant for jurisdictional purposes. Id. at 801, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
These two state cases track agency principles so closely that they do not support the
conclusion that New York courts had adopted a "conspiracy theory" of jurisdiction.
33. 375 F. Supp. at 322. See infra pt. II(B).
34. 375 F. Supp. at 322.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 325.
37. Id.
38. The court's refusal to grant discovery contrasts sharply with the Leasco
court's willingness to allow discovery on the jurisdictional issue when a question of
fact is presented. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d
1326, 1343-44 (2d Cir. 1972).
39. Id. at 321. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
40. See Istituto Bancario Italiano v. Hunter Eng'g Co., 449 A.2d 210, 222-25
(Del. 1982) (examining the growth of the theory in federal courts and incorporating
it for the first time into Delaware state law); Green v. Advance Ross Elecs. Corp., 86
Ill. 2d 431, 440-41, 427 N.E.2d 1203, 1208 (1981) (dictum indicating that some
courts find the theory questionable).
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fendants. 4 1 Indeed, this case and this principle are frequently cited in
later 4cases
that neither fully articulate the theory nor justify its adop2
tion.
B. JudicialResponse to the Conspiracy Theory
Judicial response to the conspiracy theory has varied widely. One
court found the theory incapable of meeting the "strict constitutional
standards" of due process. 43 The court expressed its "belie[f] that
personal jurisdiction over any non-resident individual must be premised upon forum-related acts personally committed by the individual."' 44 In its rejection of any "imputed conduct" as "too tenuous" a
basis for jurisdiction, however, this court apparently would not accept
45
even a conventional agency theory.
Other courts have accepted a broad and almost automatic use of the
theory4" as a result of their failure to differentiate between the standards governing liability and those governing jurisdiction. 47 Consequently, they have assumed that co-conspirators ought to be deemed
each other's agents in both contexts, regardless of the level of proof
and the constitutional considerations of fairness that govern personal
jurisdiction. Under this analysis, jurisdiction is based solely upon the
allegation that the out-of-state defendant conspired with a person who
acted in the forum state provided the act in the state falls within the

41. See 375 F. Supp. at 321-22.
42. See, e.g., Glaros v. Perse, 628 F.2d 679, 682 (1st Cir. 1980); Dixon v. Mack,
507 F. Supp. 345, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Chazoul v. International Mgmt. Servs., 398
F. Supp. 307, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
43. Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 873 n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The
court, harkening back to the ill-fated line of antitrust venue cases which fell under
the weight of the Supreme Court's "frivolous albeit ingenious" dictum, see supra note
18, found the application of the theory in the jurisdictional context "much more
frivolous." 422 F. Supp. at 873 n.14.
44. Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 873 n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
45. See id.
46. See, e.g., Cherokee Laboratories v. Rotary Drilling Servs., 383 F.2d 97, 103
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 904 (1968); National Van Lines, Inc. v. Atlas
Van Lines, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 1087, 1089-90 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Maricopa County v.
American Petrofina, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 467, 469 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
47. The most sweeping endorsements of the conspiracy theory are misleading
because they appear in cases in which the defendant had not even denied the
allegations of conspiracy. See, e.g., National Van Lines, Inc. v. Atlas Van Lines,
Inc., 406 F. Supp. 1087, 1089-90 (N.D. Ill.
1975) (jurisdiction sufficient if allegations
of conspiracy not controverted by defendant); Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp.
692, 696-97 (D.D.C. 1973) (jurisdiction based on conclusory allegations of conspiracy sufficient, but the "situation would be quite different on this point, if the
allegations of the complaint were controverted or if the facts should develop otherwise than as alleged").
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state's long-arm statute. 48 For example, in Mandelkorn v. Patrick,49
the District Court for the District of Columbia asserted jurisdiction

based only on the plaintiff's allegation that the defendants conspired

to forcibly remove the plaintiff from a religious sect. 50 The court
rejected Leasco's requirement of a factual showing of an agency relationship to establish jurisdiction over co-conspirators, finding instead
that allegations of conspiracy, even when made in a conclusory fashion, justify an assertion of jurisdiction over a non-resident co-conspirator. 51 The court found that the difficulties of proving a conspiracy at

the pleading stage require a more lenient standard for establishing
52
jurisdiction in a conspiracy case than in a business agency case.

It

should be noted, however, that Mandelkorn's acceptance of the theory
was based largely on the fact that the defendant failed to controvert
53
the conspiracy allegations.
Most courts have parroted Leasco in stating that the mere presence
of a co-conspirator in the forum state does not confer jurisdiction, but
like the court in Socialist Workers Party, have assumed that the
conspiracy theory is available in appropriate cases .54 Courts have
concentrated on determining whether the particular case facing them
is an "appropriate" one. As a result of both the basic assumption that
the theory exists and its case-by-case application, the standards gov-

48. Cherokee Laboratories v. Rotary Drilling Servs., 383 F.2d 97, 103 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 904 (1968); Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v.
Roussel, 445 F. Supp. 687, 696 (D. Kan. 1978); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld,
410 F. Supp. 144, 151 (D.D.C. 1976); National Van Lines, Inc. v. Atlas Van Lines,
Inc., 406 F. Supp. 1087, 1089 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp.
692, 696 (D.D.C. 1973); Maricopa County v. American Petrofina, Inc., 322 F. Supp.
467, 469 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Reeves v. Phillips, 54 A.D.2d 854, 855, 388 N.Y.S.2d 294,
296 (1976). Some of these cases, despite the acceptance of attribution of contacts
based on the mere existence of conspiracy, do require more than a bare allegation of
conspiracy to support jurisdiction. For a discussion of the burden of proof imposed on
the party asserting jurisdiction, see infra pt. II(B).
49. 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1973).
50. Id. at 696.
51. Id. The court's decision is criticized in McLaughlin v. Copeland, 435 F.
Supp. 513, 532 (D. Md. 1977).
52. 359 F. Supp. at 696.
53. See id. at 695-96.
54. Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 375 F. Supp. 318, 321-22
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); see Lehigh Valley Indus. v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87, 93-94 (2d
Cir. 1975); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1132 (D. Mass
1982); Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1347 (E.D.N.Y.
1981); National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., 504 F. Supp. 305, 313 (N.D.
Ga. 1980); Louis Marx & Co. v. Fuji Seiko Co., 453 F. Supp. 385, 391-92 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Merkel Assocs. v. Bellofram Corp., 437 F. Supp. 612, 617 (W.D.N.Y. 1977);
McLaughlin v. Copeland, 435 F. Supp. 513, 530 (D. Md. 1977); Chemical Bank v.
World Hockey Ass'n, 403 F. Supp. 1374, 1379 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Ghazoul v. International Mgmt. Servs., 398 F. Supp. 307, 309-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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erning it have been built up by accretion. Reviewing all of these cases,
one could compile a formidable list of required "elements" of the
theory, but because courts have tended to isolate the single point that
is dispositive of the case before them5 5 or to overlook certain requirements when they are clearly present in the case at bar, 56 no single case
states a definitive test.. 7 The next section presents a distillation of these
cases and sets forth the range of requirements that courts have applied.
II. APPLICATION OF THE CONSPIRACY THEORY
A. Elements of the Factual Showing Requiredfor the
Attribution of JurisdictionalContacts
At a minimum, most courts require a plaintiff to allege facts which,
if proven, show: 1) that a conspiracy existed;5 8 2) that the defendant
over whom jurisdiction is sought became a member of the conspiracy;" and 3) that a co-conspirator committed an act-or a "substantial act"-in furtherance of the conspiracy in the forum state. 60 Some

55. See Grove Press, Inc. v. Angleton, 649 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 1981) (membership in the alleged conspiracy); Mandaglio v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters,
528 F. Supp. 468, 471 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (whether conspiracy actually existed); Bulova
Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1348 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (need to
connect defendant to transactions in forum state); Louis Marx & Co. v. Fuji Seiko
Co., 453 F. Supp. 385, 391-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (membership and whether act by
alleged co-conspirator falls within enumerated acts in long-arm statute); McLaughlin
v. Copeland, 435 F. Supp. 513, 532 (D. Md. 1977) (whether defendant knew or
should have known that alleged conspiracy would have effect in forum state).
56. See, e.g., Vermont Castings, Inc. v. Evans Prods., 510 F. Supp. 940, 944-45
(D. Vt. 1981) (omitting discussion of membership requirement); Dixon v. Mack, 507
F. Supp. 345, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (omitting discussion of act in furtherance of
conspiracy).
57. See National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., 504 F. Supp. 305, 313
(N.D. Ga. 1980) (noting "considerable confusion" in the case law); Istituto Bancario
Italiano v. Hunter Eng'g Co., 449 A.2d 210, 222-25 (Del. 1982) (discussing various
showings required).
58. E.g., Gilday v. Quinn, 547 F. Supp. 803, 805 (D. Mass. 1982); Dixon v.
Mack, 507 F. Supp. 345, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Merkel Assocs. v. Bellofram Corp.,
437 F. Supp. 612, 617 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Ghazoul v. International Mgmt. Servs., 398
F. Supp. 307, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Istituto Bancario Italiano v. Hunter Eng'g Co.,
449 A.2d 210, 225 (Del. 1982).
59. E.g., Gilday v. Quinn, 547 F. Supp. 803, 805 (D. Mass. 1982); Dixon v.
Mack, 507 F. Supp. 345, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Louis Marx & Co. v. Fuji Seiko Co.,
453 F. Supp. 385, 391-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Merkel Assocs. v. Bellofram Corp., 437 F.
Supp. 612, 617 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Ghazoul v. International Mgmt. Servs., 398 F.
Supp. 307, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Istituto Bancario Italiano v. Hunter Eng'g Co., 449
A.2d 210, 225 (Del. 1982).
60. E.g., Gilday v. Quinn, 547 F. Supp. 803, 805 (D. Mass. 1982); Vermont
Castings, Inc. v. Evans Prods., 510 F. Supp. 940, 944 (D. Vt. 1981) ("crucial act");
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courts condense this tripartite test into the requirement that the defendant have some "connection"-or "substantial connection"-to the

alleged contact with the forum state. 6 1 A fourth requirement, often

left unexpressed, is that the act attributed to the defendant through
extraterritorial service
the conspiracy theory must provide a basis for
62
of process under the relevant statutory law.
Gemini Enters. v. WFMY Television Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559, 564 (M.D.N.C. 1979)
("substantial acts"); Merkel Assocs. v. Bellofram Corp., 437 F. Supp. 612, 616-17
(W.D.N.Y. 1977) ("specific act"); Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838, 84749 (S.D. Fla. 1975) ("tortious act"); Istituto Bancario Italiano v. Hunter Eng'g Co.,
449 A. 2d 210, 225, 227 (Del. 1982) ("substantial act," "essential step"); see also
Maricopa County v. American Petrofina, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 467, 469 (N.D. Cal.
1971) (allowing jurisdiction over co-conspirators in case in which injury occurred
within the state but acts creating injury occurred outside the forum).
61. E.g., Glaros v. Perse, 628 F.2d 679, 682 n.4 (1st Cir. 1980) ("connection
between the out-of-state defendants and specific acts" within the forum); Van
Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1132 (D. Mass. 1982) (same);
Dixon v. Mack, 507 F. Supp. 345, 348-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (facts connecting defendant to the conspiracy); Clark v. United States, 481 F. Supp. 1086, 1096-97 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (facts alleged connecting defendant to the conspiracy), appeal dismissed, 624
F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1980); Chromium Indus. v Mirror Polishing & Plating Co., 448 F.
Supp. 544, 553 (N.D. Ill. 1978) ("factual connection"); Ghazoul v. International
Mgmt. Servs., 398 F. Supp. 307, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("sufficient nexus"); Socialist
Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 375 F. Supp. 318, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("evidentiary facts to connect the defendant with transactions"); Turner v. Baxley, 354 F.
Supp. 963, 977 (D. Vt. 1972) ("substantial connection"). This analysis is particularly
common among courts that ultimately find the factual allegations too weak to
support jurisdiction. The "substantial connection" test can also be seen as including
an analysis of the foreseeability of defendant's being required to defend in the forum.
See infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
62. Cawley v. Bloch, 544 F. Supp. 133, 134-35 (D. Md. 1982); Istituto Bancario
Italiano v. Hunter Eng'g Co., 449 A.2d 210, 223 n.15 (Del. 1982); see, e.g., Dixon v.
Mack, 507 F. Supp. 345, 348-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (tortious acts); Weinstein v. Norman M. Morris Corp., 432 F. Supp. 337, 344 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (transacting business); Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 375 F. Supp. 318, 321-22 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (tortious acts committed within the state); Turner v. Baxley, 354 F. Supp. 963,
975 (D. Vt. 1972) (activity sufficient to support personal judgment). The conspiracy
itself may not be recognized as a tort under state liability law and hence may not
alone form a basis for jurisdiction under a long-arm statute that permits service of
process based upon a tort committed in the forum state. The act in furtherance of the
conspiracy, therefore, must actually be tortious to support jurisdiction. See Louis
Marx & Co. v. Fuji Seiko Co., 453 F. Supp. 385, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); McLaughlin
v. Copeland, 435 F. Supp. 513, 525 (D. Md. 1977); see also Rutkin v. Reinfeld, 229
F.2d 244, 252 (2d Cir. 1956) ("The charge of conspiracy in a civil action is merely the
string whereby the plaintiff seeks to tie together those who, acting in concert, may be
held responsible in damages for any overt act or acts."). When the long-arm statute
in question extends jurisdiction to the full reach of constitutional due process, analysis
of this fourth requirement will merge with the constitutional considerations. See,
e.g., Vermont Castings, Inc. v. Evans Prods., 510 F. Supp. 940, 943 (D. Vt. 1981);
Speckine v. Stanwick Int'l., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (W.D. Mich. 1980);
Gemini Enters. v. WFMY Television Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559, 563-64 (M.D.N.C.
1979).
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Among those courts that make a more detailed analysis, two other
major areas of inquiry emerge. The first is whether the conventional
attributes of agency are present. Although a showing of "formal
agency" is not always considered necessary, 63 some courts impose
requirements tracking those of business agency. 4 They examine
whether the non-resident defendant consented to or directed the act in
the forum state and whether the act was done on his behalf or for his
benefit.6 5 The second area of inquiry is foreseeability, which may or
66
may not explicitly advert to constitutional standards of due process.
Either because most of the cases dealing with this issue predate
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson's67 shift from foreseeability to

purposeful availment as the test of due process,68 or because they are
applying Leasco as the Turner court did,6 9 courts ask whether the
non-resident defendant should reasonably have foreseen that the conspiracy would have an effect in the forum state. 70 These courts fre-

quently assert that the level of foreseeability necessary to justify an
63. E.g., Lehigh Valley Indus. v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87, 90 n.3 (2d Cir.
1975); Dixon v. Mack, 507 F. Supp. 345, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Clark v. United
States, 481 F. Supp. 1086, 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), appeal dismissed, 624 F.2d 3 (2d
Cir. 1980). This is true even when applying conventional agency principles of jurisdiction. Galgay v. Bulletin Co., 504 F.2d 1062, 1065 (2d Cir. 1974).
64. E.g., Grove Press, Inc. v. Angleton, 649 F.2d 121, 122 (2d Cir. 1981); Dixon
v. Mack, 507 F. Supp. 345, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Weinstein v. Norman M. Morris
Corp., 432 F. Supp. 337, 343 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
65. E.g., Grove Press, Inc. v. Angleton, 649 F.2d 121, 122 (2d Cir. 1981); Dixon
v. Mack, 507 F. Supp. 345, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Weinstein v. Norman M. Morris
Corp., 432 F. Supp. 337, 343-44 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
66. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296-98
(1980) (rejecting due process analysis based only on the foreseeability of effects within
the forum, in favor of an analysis which examines whether defendant "purposefully
avails" himself of the benefits of a state's law).
67. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
68. Id. at 295-98. World-Wide Volkswagen held that foreseeability alone does
not make an assertion of jurisdiction constitutional. The expectation that a defendant
would be subject to jurisdiction must flow from its having "purposefully avail[ed]
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State." Id. at 297
(citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)); see Note, Retractingthe Long
Arm: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 22 B.C.L.
Rev. 385, 398 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Retracting the Long Arm]; Bauxites'
"Individual Liberty Interest" and the Right to Control Amenability to Suit in Personal JurisdictionAnalysis, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 1278, 1284-85 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Individual Liberty Interest].
69. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326,
1341 (2d Cir. 1972) (foreseeability required), on remand, 68 F.R.D. 178, 183-84
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (looking for "purposeful availment" under Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958)); Gemini Enters. v. WFMY Television Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559, 564
(M.D.N.C. 1979) ("co-conspirator knew or should have known that acts would be
performed in the forum state"); Ammon v. Kaplow, 468 F. Supp. 1304, 1312 (D.
Kan. 1979) ("foreseeable consequences"); Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v.
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exercise of jurisdiction exceeds "the rather low floor of foreseeability
necessary to support a finding of tort liability."7 1 They also require

allegations showing that each defendant knew or should have known
that his actions outside the forum state would have an effect in the
forum state. 72 Stating this requirement more succinctly, a court may
consider whether the alleged conspiracy was "directed toward" or
"calculated to have an effect in" the forum state. 73 Under this analysis,
due process will not permit the plaintiff to use insignificant
acts in the
74
forum to assert jurisdiction over all co-conspirators.
Roussel, 445 F. Supp. 687, 694-96 (D. Kan. 1978) (foreseeability); McLaughlin v.
Copeland, 435 F. Supp. 513, 531-32 (D. Md. 1977) (whether defendant "knew or
should have known" that his activity would have effects in the forum); Turner v.
Baxley, 354 F. Supp. 963, 977 (D. Vt. 1972) (same).
Two cases decided after World-Wide Volkswagen that mention constitutional
considerations in connection with the conspiracy theory are Vermont Castings, Inc.
v. Evans Prods., 510 F. Supp. 940, 944 (D. Vt. 1981) (acknowledgement of due
process limit on jurisdiction, with citation to Turner v. Baxley, 354 F. Supp. 963 (D.
Vt. 1972)) and Istituto Bancario Italiano v. Hunter Eng'g Co., 449 A.2d 210, 219-22,
225 (Del. 1982) (finding a strict conspiracy jurisdiction test consistent with due
process, in that a defendant who "voluntarily participated in a conspiracy with
knowledge of its acts in or effects in the forum state can be said to have purposefully
availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, thereby
fairly invoking the benefits and burdens of its laws"). See also Vest v. Waring, 565 F.
Supp. 674, 694 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (applying purposeful availment test in basing
conspiracy jurisdiction on alleged act of entering into the conspiracy in the forum
state; attribution of contacts not involved).
Some courts have confused the question of the foreseeability of the effect that the
conspiracy would have in the forum state with the foreseeability of the effect of an
act directly committed by the out-of-state defendant, when the act is also in furtherance of a conspiracy. See National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., 504 F.
Supp. 305, 313-14 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (noting confusion among courts); see, e.g.,
Weinstein v. Norman M. Morris Corp., 432 F. Supp. 337, 344-45 (E.D. Mich. 1977);
Gypsy Pipeline v. Ivanhoe Petroleum, 256 F. Supp. 567, 568 (D. Colo. 1966). See
supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. Both questions require careful analysis of
constitutional due process, but only the former involves the use of the conspiracy
theory for the purpose of attributing to one defendant the acts of another. The latter
is no different from cases involving any tortious act outside the state that causes
injury in the state. Those cases and other "effects jurisdiction" cases do, however,
provide useful insight into how a court should analyze the fairness of the attribution
process. See infra text accompanying notes 124-26.
71. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1341 &
n.11 (2d Cir. 1972). On remand and after discovery, the district court examined
whether the non-resident defendant had committed some act outside the forum state
that he knew or should have known would "directly contribute" to the act in
furtherance of the conspiracy that did take place in the forum state. 68 F.R.D. 178,
182 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
72. E.g., Vermont Castings, Inc. v. Evans Prods., 510 F. Supp. 940, 944 (D. Vt.
1981); Gemini Enters. v. WFMY Television Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559, 564
(M.D.N.C. 1979); Turner v. Baxley, 354 F. Supp. 963, 977 (D. Vt. 1972). See infra
note 136.
73. Turner v. Baxley, 354 F. Supp. 963, 977 (D. Vt. 1972).
74. See id.
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Courts have assumed that a conspiracy theory of jurisdiction exists
and have concentrated on whether it applies to the particular facts
presented, and thus the identification of the elements of the showing

that must be made has been overshadowed by the problem of estab75
lishing the level of proof the party asserting jurisdiction must meet.
The problem of proof has troubled courts because prior to discovery

the plaintiff usually lacks personal knowledge of the inner workings of
the alleged conspiracy. 76 Further difficulties arise because the attribution process upon which jurisdiction depends
is viewed as inextricably
77

tied to the substantive merits of the case.

B. The Problem of Proof on Motion to Dismiss: the Inextricable
Merits of a Case
Although the party asserting jurisdiction ultimately bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, 7 that party may
survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction simply by
alleging facts that if proved would support a prima facie finding of
jurisdiction.7 The court then will view itself as possessing "threshold
jurisdiction," permitting it to retain the case through the discovery
and motion stages.8 0 As long as the court makes no conclusive finding
of personal jurisdiction, the defendant may, upon further develop-

75. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1237 (6th Cir.
1980) (insufficient allegations to support conspiracy claim), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
893 (1981); Glaros v. Perse, 628 F.2d 679, 682 (1st Cir. 1980) (same); Bennett Waites
Corp. v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 810, 812 (D. Colo. 1983) (same);
National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., 504 F. Supp. 305, 314 (N.D. Ga.
1980) (finding jurisdiction based on allegations showing foreseeability); Gemini Enters. v. WFMY Television Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559, 564-65 (M.D.N.C. 1979) (finding jurisdiction based on uncontroverted allegations); Chemical Bank v. World
Hockey Ass'n, 403 F. Supp 1374, 1379 (S.D.N.Y 1975) (mere allegations of conspiracy insufficient to support jurisdiction); Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen.,
375 F. Supp. 318, 321-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (same).
76. Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692, 696 (D.D.C. 1973).
77. See R. Casad, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions 4.03[1][b], at 4-65 (1983).
78. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182, 189 (1936).
79. E.g., United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 919_(1966); Vermont Castings, Inc. v. Evans Prods., 510 F. Supp.
940, 944 (D. Vt. 1981); McLaughlin v. Copeland, 435 F. Supp. 513, 530 (D. Md.
1977); Ghazoul v. International Mgmt Servs., 398 F. Supp. 307, 309-10 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); see 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1068, at 250
(1969 & Supp. 1983).
80. Vermont Castings, Inc. v. Evans Prods., 510 F. Supp. 940, 944 (D. Vt.
1981); McLaughlin v. Copeland, 435 F. Supp. 513, 530 (D. Md. 1977); Ghazoul v.
International Mgmt. Servs., 398 F. Supp. 307, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see Insurance
Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 (1982); Note,
The Use of Rule 37(b) Sanctions to Enforce JurisdictionalDiscovery, 50 Fordham L.
Rev. 814, 839-40 (1982).
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ment of the record, renew its motion to dismiss."' If the party asserting
jurisdiction raises a question of fact as to whether jurisdiction exists,
the court may defer the motion pending discovery on the jurisdiction
issue alone, and afterwards, determine whether it may properly exercise jurisdiction. 82 To some extent, this approach takes into account
the interests of both parties. If the plaintiff has demonstrated some
likelihood that he can eventually prove jurisdiction, the court will
provide him with the opportunity to discover the facts needed to carry
his burden. The defendant, on the other hand, may avoid the burdens
of discovery by convincing the court that the jurisdictional allegations
are inadequate.
Tailoring these concepts to the conspiracy theory raises special
problems. It is difficult before discovery for a plaintiff to come forward with detailed allegations about something as inherently hidden
as conspiracy.8 3 Conversely, it is all too easy for a plaintiff to append a
bald allegation of conspiracy to the allegation that one of several codefendants has acted in the forum state. Before courts will exercise
threshold jurisdiction, therefore, they will generally require that the

plaintiff allege definite facts that, if proved, would establish the ele-

ments of conspiracy jurisdiction.8 4 Allegations "based on nothing but
speculation and conjecture" are not considered enough to impose the
burdens of discovery on the defendant.8 5 This solution often provides

81. See, e.g., Vermont Castings, Inc. v. Evans Prods., 510 F. Supp. 940, 944 n.2
(D. Vt. 1981); Dixon v. Mack, 507 F. Supp. 345, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Ghazoul v.
International Mgmt Servs., Inc., 398 F. Supp. 307, 309-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
82. See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326,
1343-44 (2d Cir. 1972); Saraceno v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 65, 66, 7172 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 151
(D.D.C. 1976).
83. Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692, 696 (D.D.C. 1973).
84. E.g., Textor v. Board of Regents, 711 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (7th Cir. 1983);
Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1236-37 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 893 (1981); Lehigh Valley Indus. v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87, 93-94 (2d Cir.
1975); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1132-33 (D. Mass.
1982); Clark v. United States, 481 F. Supp. 1086, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), appeal
dismissed, 624 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1980); Merkel Assocs. v. Bellofram Corp., 437 F.
Supp. 612, 616 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Kenyatta v. Kelley, 430 F. Supp. 1328, 1331 (E.D.
Pa. 1977); Chemical Bank v. World Hockey Ass'n, 403 F. Supp. 1374, 1379
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Ghazoul v. International Mgmt. Servs., 398 F. Supp. 307, 312
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 375 F. Supp. 318, 322
(S.D.N.Y 1974); Turner v. Baxley, 354 F. Supp. 963, 977 (D. Vt. 1972). But see
Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692, 696 (D.D.C. 1973) (allegations of overt
acts and conclusory allegations of conspiracy are sufficient when the conclusory
allegations are not controverted).
85. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1133 (D. Mass.
1982); see, e.g., Chemical Bank v. World Hockey Ass'n, 403 F. Supp. 1374, 1379
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 375 F. Supp. 318, 325
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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an escape from the problem of proof. If the court can isolate some

element of the required showing that the plaintiff has failed to support

with allegations of definite facts, it can grant the motion to dismiss. 86

But if the defendant has not controverted the plaintiff's definite factual allegations, the court can either deny the motion subject to
renewal after discovery8 7 or defer decision on the motion until after
the plaintiff has conducted discovery on the issue of jurisdiction., s
This method of dealing with the jurisdictional motion breaks down

when the plaintiffs allegations are complete and the defendant submits affidavits-typically his own sworn denials-refuting those allegations. This situation will become increasingly common as litigants
acquire familiarity with the conspiracy theory. Plaintiffs will focus on

pleading appropriate facts for each element of the showing and will
emphasize their need for discovery. Defendants will learn not to rely
on the contention that they simply never "set foot" in the forum
state. 9 Courts faced with defendants' affidavits have permitted discovery on the jurisdiction issue because the plaintiff usually lacks
access to any witness with direct knowledge of the conspiracy itself

and thus cannot meet the defendant's sworn denial with affidavits of

his own.9 0 Appellate courts have deferred to the trial courts' discretion
in ordering discovery. 91 Thus, they have delineated no guidelines
86. E.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1237 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981); Lehigh Valley Indus. v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87, 93-94
(2d Cir. 1975); Chromium Indus. v. Mirror Polishing & Plating Co., 448 F. Supp.
544, 553 (N.D. Ill. 1978); McLaughlin v. Copeland, 435 F. Supp. 513, 532-33 (D.
Md. 1977).
87. E.g., Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Roussel, 445 F. Supp. 687, 697
(D. Kan. 1978); Ghazoul v. International Mgmt. Servs., 398 F. Supp. 307, 313-14
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); see Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692, 696-97 & n.8a
(D.D.C. 1973).
88. See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326,
1343-44 (2d Cir. 1972); Saraceno v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 65, 66, 7172 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 151
(D.D.C. 1976).
89. Cf. Chazoul v. International Mgmt. Servs., 398 F. Supp. 307, 313 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (motion to dismiss denied upon defendant's failure to controvert allegations
relating to conspiracy theory, relying instead on allegation that he never physically
entered forum state).
90. See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326,
1343-44 (2d Cir. 1972) (improper to grant motion to dismiss prior to discovery on
jurisdiction issue in face of conflicting affidavits); Clark v. United States, 481 F.
Supp. 1086, 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (defendant denied nonconclusory allegations,
court found decision inextricable from merits and therefore denied motion), appeal
dismissed, 624 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1980). But see American Land Program, Inc. v.
Bonaventura Uitgevers Maatschappij N.V., 710 F. 2d 1449, 1454 (10th Cir. 1983)
(dismissal affirmed where plaintiff failed to adequately controvert defendant's denial
of allegations); Gilday v. Quinn, 547 F. Supp. 803, 806-07 (D. Mass. 1982) (same).
91. See Voegeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89, 96 (8th Cir. 1977); Data Disc, Inc. v.
Systems Technology Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977); Swanner v.
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controlling this process, except to the extent
that they may find the
92
trial court's decision an abuse of discretion.
Discovery on jurisdiction ordinarily involves inquiry into a circumscribed sphere of facts93 about which there is little or no controversy,
such as the nature of the defendant's business or the relationship
between a parent corporation and its subsidiary. When conspiracy
theory underlies the jurisdiction issue, however, that discovery may be

coextensive with the discovery on the merits and may involve hotly
contested issues central to the plaintiff's cause of action. Proceeding
even to the discovery stage on the jurisdiction issue represents "an
assertion of jurisdiction to some extent" 94 that may be extremely burdensome in conspiracy cases. This burden seems particularly offensive
when it is not based on a finding of threshold jurisdiction but merely
on an impasse created by the court's recognition of the plaintiffs
inability to counter factual proof submitted by the defendant.
In concentrating on the problems of discovery and proof, courts
have failed to address the question whether the conspiracy theory of
jurisdiction satisfies due process requirements or even to delineate
clear and predictable standards governing its use. The practice of
United States, 406 F.2d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1969); Surety Ass'n of Am. v. Republic
Ins. Co., 388 F.2d 412, 414 (2d Cir. 1967).
92. E.g., Textor v. Board of Regents, 711 F.2d 1387, 1393 (7th Cir. 1983);
McLaughlin v. McPhail, 707 F.2d 800, 807 (4th Cir. 1983); Lehigh Valley Indus. v.
Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1975); see Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1343-44 (2d Cir. 1972). In Leasco, the district
court faced conflicting affidavits, but found that only a "very strained reading" of
plaintiff's affidavit could produce a question of fact. 319 F. Supp. 1256, 1260
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). Moreover, plaintiffs allegations were not based on personal knowledge. Id. The Second Circuit, on the other hand, perceived "many unresolved
questions of fact." 468 F.2d at 1343. Interestingly, that court took into account that
the proposed discovery on the jurisdiction issue would neither impose undue burdens
nor delay the trial. It is thus difficult to determine whether this court would always
require discovery in the face of any conceivable question of fact or whether it would
balance the proposed hardship on the defendant against the substantiality of the
question of fact. Another kind of balancing was used in Turner v. Baxley, 354 F.
Supp. 963 (D. Vt. 1972), in which the court weighed the reasonableness of requiring
a non-resident to defend in the forum against the hardship of forcing the plaintiff to
pursue its action in many forums. Id. at 977. The latter hardship is offset by the
consideration that permitting the plaintiff to consolidate litigation may enable him to
forum shop and to harass defendants, in contravention of principles of due process.
See infra pt. III(B)(2) (court's decision should rest on a balancing of factors).
93. 4 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice 26.56[6], at 26-191 (2d ed.
1983).
94. Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 375 F. Supp. 318, 325 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). Of course, by appearing in the case and contesting jurisdiction, the defendant
consents to follow the court's discovery orders. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 (1982). See infra note 130 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the court's proper exercise of discretion, even though it may be
unreviewable, is the key to providing due process at this stage.
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deferring consideration of motions presenting questions of fact until
trial on the merits tends to defy appellate review. By the time a
defendant is in a position to appeal the use of the conspiracy theory,
he will have lost on the merits and the plaintiff's allegations of conspiracy will already be established findings of fact.9 5 Of course, if a
defendant prevails on the merits, he will have no motive to appeal. In
those rare instances when the question is presented on appeal, the
appellate court is likely to defer to the trial judge's discretion in
matters of discovery. 96 The following section, therefore, offers the
groundwork for renewed judicial scrutiny of the conspiracy theory.
III.

ANALYSIS

A. Due Process Analysis of the Conspiracy Theory
Constitutional due process requires that all assertions of personal
jurisdiction rest upon sufficient "minimum contacts" to satisfy "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 9' 7 This fairness
analysis has replaced "the patchwork of legal and factual fictions"98
used to justify various exercises of jurisdiction under the territorial
power-based analysis enunciated in Pennoyer v. Neff. 99

95. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous ....");9 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 79, § 2587 n.30.
Similar problems of proof exist in cases dealing with admission of the hearsay
statements of a co-conspirator. See supra note 8. Once the conspiracy has been
factually established at trial, it will be diffibult for the defendant to contest the
existence of the conspiracy on the issue of the admissability of the evidence. The
decision to admit the evidence is solely within the discretion of the judge. Fed. R.
Evid. 104(a) (1976); see United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 22-23 (1st Cir.
1977). In order to protect defendants from having evidence improperly admitted,
many courts have raised the standard of proof required for the admission of a coconspirator's hearsay statement. Instead of the traditional test requiring a prima facie
showing of conspiracy, evidence will be admitted only if conspiracy is proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 922 (1978); United States v Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20,
23 (1st Cir. 1977).
96. See Voegeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89, 96 (8th Cir. 1977); Data Disc, Inc. v.
Systems Technology Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977); Swanner v.
United States, 406 F.2d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1969); Surety Ass'n of Am. v. Republic
Ins. Co., 388 F.2d 412, 414 (2d Cir. 1967).
97. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
207 (1977) (applying the test of "fair play and substantial justice" to quasi in rem
jurisdiction).
98. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 219 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
99. 95 U.S. 714 (1878), discussed in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 196-204
(1977); see Clermont, supra note 1, at 414-16; Kurland, The Supreme Court, the
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Any theory of jurisdiction derived from a state's statutory or common law must survive the test of fairness based on the defendant's
contacts with the forum state. 10 0 Thus, a court may not simply take
the principle of state law that a co-conspirator acts as the agent of the
other conspirators, plug it into the state's jurisdiction statute, and
exercise whatever purported jurisdiction flows from that combination. The process of combining the two legal premises must itself
survive due process scrutiny. Indeed, the attenuation involved in attributing one person's jurisdictional contacts to another should inspire
increased vigilance. In Rush v. Savchuk, 1° 1 the Supreme Court found
"plainly unconstitutional" the state court's attribution of an insurer's
contacts to its insured.10 2 The Court stated that "the parties' relationships with each other may be significant in evaluating their ties to the
forum. The requirements of International Shoe, however, must be
met as to each defendant over whom a state court exercises jurisdic03
tion."
The legal principle that co-conspirators act as each other's agents
when they act in furtherance of a conspiracy should not, by automatic
operation of law, permit the attribution of one party's forum contacts
to another. 0 4 Rather, the particular facts of the relationship between
the parties must support the conclusion that the non-resident knew or
should have known that by entering into the relationship he was
exposing himself to the risk that he could be haled into court in the
forum state. 0 5 That conclusion must rest not on a conceptual device
but on a finding that the non-resident, through his relationship with
another, has "purposefully avail[ed him]self of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.'1 0 6 The relationship may be
described in terms of conspiracy, but such a characterization should
Due ProcessClauseand the In PersonamJurisdictionof State Courts, FromPennoyer
to Denckla: Review, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569, 574-86 (1958); Retracting the Long
Arm, supra note 68, at 385-86; Comment, Federalism,Due Process, and Minimum
Contacts: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1341,
1341 (1980).
100. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 290-92
(1980); F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 12.14, at 633 (2d ed. 1977). The
statutory and constitutional inquiries will be merged in states that interpret their
long-arm statutes as extending jurisdiction to the limits of the due process clause. See
444 U.S. at 290; R. Casad, supra note 77, 4.01[1].
101. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
102. Id. at 331-32.
103. Id. at 332.
104. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (rejecting "mechanical or quantitative" test of jurisdiction, and instead considering "the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of

the laws").
105. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
106. Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).

1983]

ESTABLISHING CONSPIRACY JURISDICTION

253

not mask the real facts of the relationship or avoid analysis of the
attribution process. The term "conspiracy" is meaningful only to the
extent that it helps to elucidate those facts.
The earliest cases discussing the concept of conspiracy in attributing
jurisdictional ties properly used the term merely to describe the relationship of the parties. 0 7 When the facts demonstrated that the outof-state defendant agreed to a plan whereby another person would act
on his behalf in the forum state, courts needed to indulge in little
analysis to justify attribution of contacts to the defendant. 08 The term
"conspiracy" served to describe the agreement and explain these facts,
but did not short-circuit the due process analysis. 0 9 In later cases,
however, courts began to assume that an independent conspiracy
theory existed and that it could be used as a device to bridge a gap
they could not otherwise close." 0
Automatic attribution of contacts upon a showing of conspiracy
avoids consideration of the individual defendant's contact with the
forum state-the very essence of jurisdiction."' No finding is made
whether each defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the state through the acts of the coconspirator" 2 or whether he had any opportunity, short of avoiding
the transaction altogether," 3 to structure his activities to avoid contacts with that state." 4 In some conspiracy cases the co-conspirator's
connection with the forum will be clear. However, before it may
properly assert jurisdiction, a court must find actual or constructive
knowledge on the part of each defendant that the conspiracy could
lead to the kind of significant contact with the state that would
support jurisdiction. It cannot rely on a conspiracy "theory" to hold
every individual defendant to the expectation of a particular forum
simply because one of the alleged co-conspirators happened to choose
that state as the place to perform an act." 5

107. See supra note 32.

108. See id.
109. See id.

110. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
111. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
112. See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
113. It is important not to conclude prematurely that a defendant has no right to
conduct conspiratorial transactions regardless of how he "structures" them. The
transactions underlying a claim based on conspiracy may be the conduct of legitimate

business or of law enforcement that will ultimately be vindicated at trial.

114. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
115. If a non-resident defendant is clearly responsible for the particular act, but
has willfully chosen to remain ignorant of the places where the act might be commit-

ted, a court could find that he should have expected the effect in the forum state. A
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In this necessary constitutional analysis, the question whether to
recognize a conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction evaporates. Insofar as conspiracy theory becomes a device to bypass due process
analysis, it is plainly unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the idea of conspiracy, deprived of its talismanic properties, can help to describe a
relationship among defendants and can thus contribute to the analysis
of a defendant's jurisdictional contacts. In order to promote predictability of jurisdictional consequences and guide the structuring of a
potential defendant's activities,116 a framework is needed for analyzing when attribution may constitutionally flow from allegations involving conspiracy.
B. A Frameworkfor the JurisdictionalAnalysis of
Conspiracy Allegations
1. Elements of the Jurisdictional Analysis
Assume a court is presented with a complaint joining numerous
defendants on the theory that all conspired to harm the plaintiff and
that one defendant in fact injured the plaintiff in the forum state. The
plaintiff asserts that there is jurisdiction over all defendants based
upon that single act; no other forum contact is alleged. How should a
court, consistent with due process, approach the jurisdictional issue?
First, the court should determine whether the act in the forum state
suffices as a basis for jurisdiction over the person who actually committed it. In a state whose long-arm statute enumerates acts that may
form the basis for service of process, the act must be one of the
enumerated acts. " 7 In addition, and in a state authorizing jurisdiction
to the full reach of the Constitution," 8s the act must represent a
purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in the
state that reasonably gives rise to the expectation that the actor may
be required to defend a lawsuit in that forum based on that act.1 9 For

person setting a conspiracy in motion might also be analogized to a manufacturer
defending a negligence action who has delivered products into the stream of commerce. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), discussed in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
116. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); see
Individual Liberty Interest, supra note 68, at 1290.
117. E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 2-209 (Smith-Hurd 1983); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 60-308(b) (Supp. 1982); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 302(a) (McKinney 1972 & West
Supp. 1982-1983).
118. E.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 (West 1973); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-5-33

(1969); Wyo. Stat. § 5-1-107(a) (1977).
119. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980);
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
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example, if the act allegedly committed in furtherance of the conspiracy is a tort, it will probably fall within the terms of most long-arm
statutes and comport with constitutional standards of due process. 12 0
If the co-conspirator actor merely performs some preparatory act that
in itself causes no injury to the plaintiff, jurisdiction should fail. If the
contact with the forum state cannot support jurisdiction over the
direct actor, the court need not reach the question whether it may
attribute the contact to the alleged co-conspirators.
If the act supports jurisdiction over the actor, an analysis of the
attribution process must follow. Here, the court must find some purposeful act on the part of each defendant that justifies the inference
that he knew or should have known that that act entailed the risk of
consequences in the forum state12 ' substantial enough to require him
to defend a lawsuit in that state. 2 2 The touchstone of this analysis is
the non-acting defendant's responsibility for the forum contact which
arises from the relationship between him and the direct actor. That
responsibility may flow from actual control of the actor and benefit
from the act, 2 3 or it may flow from involvement in planning and
encouraging the co-conspirator to perform the act. On the other hand,
responsibility may not exist when one of the co-conspirators has at
some remote time and place performed an act in furtherance of the
conspiracy that the out-of-state defendant would not have anticipated.
Any analysis must ultimately answer the constitutional inquiry
whether each defendant, through his own actions, purposefully
availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum
state. 2 4 The purposefulness of the in-state actor's conduct is not
enough. Each defendant's own purposeful act in joining the conspiracy and planning the transaction must import knowledge of the risk of
significant contact with the forum. Because co-conspirators, unlike
those who directly act in the forum, do not necessarily know where
the act is committed, the court here must more carefully consider a
non-acting defendant's relation to the forum state. In this respect, the
non-actor is analogous to a non-resident defendant over whom jurisdiction is sought based on an act committed outside the state that

120. R. Casad, supra note 77,
7.02.[1][a], 7.02[2][a]; F. James & G. Hazard,
supra note 100, at 632-33.
121. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
122. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980);
Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978).
123. See Grove Press, Inc. v. Angleton, 649 F.2d 121, 122 (2d Cir. 1981); Dixon v.
Mack, 507 F. Supp. 345, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Weinstein v. Norman M. Morris
Corp., 432 F. Supp. 337, 343 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Neilson v. Sal Martorano, Inc., 36
A.D.2d 625, 626, 319 N.Y.S.2d 480, 482 (1971).
124. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
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had an effect in the forum state. 125 In both cases the effect in the
forum state must be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the

defendant's purposeful
act before a court may constitutionally exercise
12 6
jurisdiction.

2. A Proposed Method of Proof
The essential problem of basing jurisdiction on conspiracy is the
presentation of factual issues inextricable from the substantive merits
of the plaintiffs claim. If the defendant's due process rights were
served only by rendering unenforceable a judgment procured without
personal jurisdiction,12 7 proof of jurisdiction could be completely
merged with proof on the merits. Modern jurisdictional analysis,
however, is concerned with the fairness of subjecting a defendant to

the burden of litigating in a particular forum.1 28 Complete merger of

125. It is conceivable that a court could attribute an out-of-state act having an
effect in the forum state to a non-actor whom it deems responsible for the act.
However, the likelihood that those contacts will suffice is decreased.
126. In Turner v. Baxley, 354 F. Supp. 963, 976-78 (D. Vt. 1972), the court
combined two discussions of different issues of jurisdiction from Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). See supra notes 24-29
and accompanying text. In a due process analysis, the analogy of conspiracy-based
jurisdiction to effects-based jurisdiction is apt, and the heightened sensitivity to
foreseeability is appropriate to both. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
This proposed standard may be high, but it is flexible. To the extent that one may
derive a test from the present case law, that test is a rather hidebound list of
requirements that may distract the court from the true issues of responsibility and
expectation and may defeat jurisdiction through a technical failure to allege facts
relating to a particular link. Admittedly, the proposed standard will sometimes
protect a defendant who would ultimately have been held liable for a co-conspirator's act. This will happen because the place where an act occurs means little for the
purpose of liability but is central to the issue of jurisdiction. Preventing a plaintiff
from consolidating his litigation against all conspirators in a single forum will in some
cases appear harsh, but similar splitting of litigation often results from application of
jurisdictional standards. Splitting will naturally occur more frequently when the
theory of jurisdiction depends on the attribution of one person's acts to another,
because the knowledge and responsibility inherent in directly committing the act is
lacking. The added frequency of defeating consolidation must be expected as a
consequence of the increased attenuation of the attribution process and the function
of attribution in increasing the number of defendants. The interest of consolidating
litigation may enter into the balancing of the equities, see infra notes 134-37 and
accompanying text, but it should not motivate courts to omit constitutional scrutiny
of the attribution process. Given a system of jurisdiction that requires scrutiny of
purposeful direct contact with the forum state, it would be irrational to allow this
theory of attribution to operate to evade similar scrutiny.
127. Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1878) (judgment unenforceable in
sister state because of lack of personal jurisdiction cannot be enforced in rendering
state).
128. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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the jurisdictional issue with the trial on the merits imposes this burden
on the defendant regardless of whether there is jurisdiction, and therefore is unacceptable under a modern analysis.
Yet merger is precisely what will result if courts continue to rely on
the standards that govern motions for summary judgment when they
face jurisdiction questions tied to the substantive merits. These standards have the effect of delaying the jurisdiction decision until factual
questions may be conclusively resolved. 12 9 A summary judgment motion has the purpose of providing a shortened route to final judgment
on the merits when a trial is not necessary. When questions of fact
preclude granting the motion, because those questions require trial,
no interest served by the motion is compromised. Applying the same
standards to the jurisdictional motion, however, vitiates the very
interests jurisdiction is meant to serve.
Once the defendant has elected to enter the proceedings for the
purpose of establishing jurisdiction, he is entitled to the due process
inherent in the court's proper exercise of discretion. 130 Had he chosen
to default, he could have resisted any exercise of judicial power over
him, but he would also have forfeited all but the jurisdictional defense
in a collateral attack on the default judgment.13 1 If submission of the
conspiracy-jurisdiction question to the court results in its merger with
the trial on the merits and no serious threshold scrutiny, the defendant's due process rights are relegated to the scant protection available
in the default process. Some finding of threshold jurisdiction therefore
must come at the outset of the case in order to preserve due process.
The necessity of dealing with the issues of fact central to the case on
the merits does not make this task impossible, however, because a
jurisdiction motion does not depend on a conclusive determination of
what the facts are. Rather, it poses the question whether, under the
circumstances, compelling the defendant to litigate in the forum is
fair. Answering this question does not yield conclusive findings of fact.

129. See supra notes 83-88.
130. Cf. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 706 (1981) (court is authorized to order discovery to determine jurisdictional
facts and may impose Rule 37(b) sanctions on a defendant who fails to comply with
the discovery order). Bauxites authorizes discovery sanctions when the court, in its
discretion, finds such a sanction justified. While it is clear that a defendant, by
objecting to jurisdiction, subjects himself to the court's power to authorize the means
necessary to determine if jurisdiction exists, the court must exercise discretion in
determining whether to order discovery. The court has the "inherent power" to
employ the judicial mechanisms necessary to the exercise of its other powers. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980). However, "[b]ecause inherent
powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, they must be exercised with
restraint and discretion." Id.
131. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,

706 (1981).
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The problem of inextricability of the merits may thus be seen as in
reality a practical problem, and not a problem of prejudging the
merits. 132 But the interests of due process, at stake from the outset,

remove the option of combining the jurisdiction issue, with liability
simply in order to save time and avoid duplication. Finding a way to
deal with the merits in a preliminary fashion is crucial if a conspiracy
theory, which almost invariably raises central issues of fact, is to be of
any use in establishing personal jurisdiction.

An appropriate model for early decision-making may be found in
motions for preliminary injunctions. There courts must act at the
outset of a case to avoid irreparable injury to the plaintiff. They find
the needed basis for their action in the likelihood of success on the
133
merits balanced against other relevant interests.
Similarly, a court presented with a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction faces a need to justify compelling the defendant
to undergo the rigors of discovery, pretrial practice and trial. It should
also approach this motion in the framework of likelihood of success.
The likelihood that plaintiff will ultimately meet his burden of proving the existence of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence
should be balanced against the equities presented134-such as the
burden of litigation to be placed on the defendant, the prospect of
forcing the plaintiff to split his litigation, the problem of forum shop-

ping, 35 and the need to include the additional defendants in order to
obtain full relief. In making its determination, the court should look
at the entire evidentiary picture presented at the outset, including the

allegations in the complaint, as well as allegations in the plaintiffs
affidavits, the defendant's affidavits, and any documentary proof.13

132. See Jetco Elec. Indus. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir. 1973).
133. E.g., Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. CL Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 112 (8th Cir.
1981); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 634
F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Siemens Corp., 621 F.2d 499, 505
(2d Cir. 1980).
134. Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)
(analysis of due process may include factors other than the defendant's contacts, such
as "the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief"); accord
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 34 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103
S. Ct. 813 (1983).
135. See Turner v. Baxley, 354 F. Supp. 963, 977 (D. Vt. 1972) (weighing the
hardship of requiring plaintiff to pursue multiple litigation against the problem of
enabling him to forum shop).
136. Insistence that the plaintiff's allegations relating to personal jurisdiction appear in the complaint is widespread. See, e.g., Textor v. Board of Regents, 711 F.2d
1387, 1391-93 (7th Cir. 1983); Glaros v. Perse, 628 F.2d 679, 681 (1st Cir. 1981); 4
C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 79, § 1068, at 250. This requirement appears
unjustified under the Federal Rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The plaintiff should be
permitted to meet the defendant's challenge to jurisdiction with allegations contained
in affidavits. For examples of cases in which the court appeared to be willing to look
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Since it is not conclusively finding facts, the court should be permitted
at this point to make judgments of credibility and to permit concrete
allegations of evidentiary fact to defeat the motion to dismiss even in
the face of sworn denials from the defendants who purport to have
actual personal knowledge
of the facts, particularly when the equities
37
favor the plaintiff.'

The court may also apply its discretion at this point to further the
interests of fairness by viewing the initial showing solely as the step in
litigation that precedes the next opportunity to reevaluate competing
interests. Accordingly, it can grant the plaintiff limited discovery
commensurate with the strength of the showing made. The plaintiff
will then have a strong incentive to fashion a limited request for
discovery to support his argument that the burden on defendant is
light. Answering limited interrogatories will burden the defendant
little more than preparing an affidavit in support of his motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Indeed, this treatment may
motivate the defendant to submit a fairly substantial affidavit in
support of his argument that the proposed burden is not justified.
The standards that govern fact-finding distort the issue of jurisdiction and result in the antithesis of due process when the theory of
jurisdiction is firmly interwoven with the merits of the case. This
problem becomes most prominent in the area of conspiracy jurisdiction due to the abstraction involved in linking the non-acting party to
any contacts with the forum state. It is therefore important to free the
trial judge from the strictures of fact-finding standards and affirm
that it is his exercise of discretion that makes the preservation of due
process possible.
CONCLUSION

Concepts originating in the law of substantive liability can be useful
tools in the analysis of the minimum contacts that support long-arm

beyond the complaint, see Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1237
(6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981); Lehigh Valley Indus. v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1975); Dixon v. Mack, 507 F. Supp. 345, 348-49
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Merkel Assocs., Inc. v. Bellofram Corp., 437 F. Supp. 612, 616-17
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
137. Even if dismissal results, the co-conspirator charged with acting in the forum
state should remain in the case. If this defendant is not subject to jurisdiction by
reason of that act, the other defendants cannot be reached even if the contacts of the
first defendant could properly be attributed to them. See supra pt. II(B). In cases
where the in-state defendant is subject to jurisdiction but jurisdictional standards
result in granting the motions to dismiss of the non-resident defendants, the case will
proceed through discovery. The plaintiff will still have the opportunity to adduce
facts supporting attribution. The court granting the motion may specify that the
plaintiff may move to add these defendants if he subsequently becomes able to prove
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jurisdiction. They must not, however, serve as devices to avoid genuine due process analysis. The term "conspiracy" properly describes
some relationships that support the attribution of jurisdictional contacts to a defendant who has not acted in the forum state. But care
must be taken lest litigants use that term to gloss over the analysis of
fairness that applies to the attribution process. Due process considerations demand that the court deal with the jurisdiction question at the
outset of the litigation, despite the asserted inextricability of the ultimate merits of the case. The courts must focus on the fairness of
subjecting the defendant to the burdens of litigation under the circumstances presented, rather than on the appropriateness of conclusively
resolving all questions of fact. Accordingly, it is proper for the trial
court to use its judgment to balance the likelihood that the plaintiff
will ultimately meet its burden of proving jurisdiction against the
proposed burden to be placed on the defendant, a true due process
approach.
jurisdiction or to demonstrate a likelihood of proof clearly outweighing the proposed
burdens on these defendants. See Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 375 F.
Supp. 318, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).

